Mark Timmons maintains that all versions of descriptivism in ethics, particularly certain accounts of moral realism, fail. Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are or which express propositions which are true or false or approximately true, largely false, etc.
They provide different, complementary views on what it means to be moral, and illuminate one another when analysed side by side. Cornell University Press,pp. Most attempts take one or more of three forms: Harewhich holds that moral statements function like imperatives.
These thus tend to serve as contextually basic in moral belief Timmons, Metaethical theories A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theorydoes not contain any ethical evaluations. This collection of influential essays illustrates the range, depth, and importance of moral realism, the fundamental issues it raises, and the problems it faces.
The Price of Nonreductive Moral Realism. John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed.
It will be welcomed by scholars and students of philosophy, the social sciences, and political science. Harvard University Press, ; and James Rachels, ed. Timmons defends what he calls "assertoric non-descriptivism" which, unlike traditional non-descriptivist views, holds that moral sentences are typically used to make genuine assertions.
Cambridge University Press, Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. But I Could Be Wrong. We need only have combinations that reliably produce true beliefs in us, in order for our thus produced moral beliefs to be justified.
Routledge, Ethical naturalism is the view that the Good is something natural. In particular, Roman Catholic theory holds that contraception, abortionand homosexuality are ethically wrong because they interfere with nature or are unnatural.
This seems to imply that one must possess without any need for further experience or research the grounds of good answers to all kinds of skeptics in order to be justified in believing something.
Epistemic contextualism seems to vindicate such practices. Skepticism about Practical Reason. After all, one can take the conception of epistemic justification that is accepted in one's context to be epistemically significant when it is not, just as one can in the arguably more idealized, less realistic, foundationalist and coherentist cases take one's beliefs to be foundational or coherent when they are not.
See, for example, Richard Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realist in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, ), pp. ; D avid Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cam.
Geoff Sayre-McCord has published extensively on moral theory, epistemology, and modern philosophy, and has edited Essays on Moral Realism, Hume: Moral Philosophy. and Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (with Jonathan Anomaly, Geoff Brennan, and Michael Munger).
Jan 01, · For the greater part of this century, most philosophers and social scientists have eschewed moral realism. According to their view, moral facts cannot be accommodated by a suitably scientific picture of the world. However, recent developments in moral theory, the /5(19).
Professor of Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Essays on Moral Realism. Average rating: 0 out of 5 stars, based on 0 reviews Write a review. Professor of Philosophy Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Tell us if something is incorrect. This collection of influential essays illustrates the range, depth, and importance of moral realism, the fundamental.
In the discussion that follows, I adopt Geoffrey Sayre‐McCord’s understanding of “moral realism” as consisting of two theses: (1) moral claims are either literally true or false, and (2) some moral claims are literally true (see Sayre‐McCord5).
The evolutionary challenge to moral realism addressed in this paper rejects only the. Moral Realism Geoffrey Sayre-McCord UNC/Chapel Hill Introduction People come, early and easily, to think in moral terms: to see many things as good or bad, to view various options as right or wrong, to think of particular distributions as fair or unfair, to consider certain people virtuous and others vicious..Geoffrey sayre-mccord essays on moral realism